COMMENT:  An Attempt to Pick Up the Fallen Bricks of the Wall Separating Church and State After \u3ci\u3eSanta Fe v. Doe\u3c/i\u3e by Schmierer, Ross
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 67
Issue 4
SYMPOSIUM:
Cognitive Legal Studies: Categorization and
Imagination in the Mind of Law. A Conference in
Celebration of the Publication of Steven L. Winter's
Book, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind
Article 14
3-1-2002
COMMENT: An Attempt to Pick Up the Fallen
Bricks of the Wall Separating Church and State
After Santa Fe v. Doe
Ross Schmierer
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Ross Schmierer, COMMENT: An Attempt to Pick Up the Fallen Bricks of the Wall Separating Church and State After Santa Fe v. Doe, 67
Brook. L. Rev. 1291 (2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol67/iss4/14
AN ATTEMPT TO PICK UP THE FALLEN BRICKS
OF THE WALL SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE
AFTER SANTA FE v. DOE*
Of all the issues the ACLU takes on-reproductive rights,
discrimination, jail and prison conditions, abuse of kids in the public
schools, police brutality, to name a few-by far the most volatile
issue is that of school prayer. Aside from our efforts to abolish the
death penalty, it is the only issue that elicits death threats. 1
INTRODUCTION
Since its enactment, the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution2 has firmly stood to protect an individual's
freedom of religion. Although the cruelty witnessed by the
framers against those holding minority religious beliefs would
be unthinkable in America today, one cannot question the
importance of this freedom.3  Unfortunately, the dual
guarantees of the religion clauses of the First Amendment
cause a perplexing problem when there is religious speech in
@2002 Ross Schmierer. All Rights Reserved.
1 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 n.10 (1992) (quoting Michelle A. Parish,
Graduation Prayer Violates the Bill of Rights, 4 UTAH BAR. J. 19 (1991)).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend 1 ("Congress shall make no law respecting'an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the
freedom of speech. .. ).
' See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (describing how:
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came from
Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support
and attend government favored churches. The centuries immediately
before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been
filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large
part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute
political and religious supremacy .... In efforts to force loyalty to
whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league with the
government of a particular time and place, men and women had been
fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured and killed.)
Id.
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the context of a public forum. On the one hand, the Free
Speech Clause,4 intended to protect private religious
expression, forbids content-based restrictions on private
expression in the public forum. Yet, on the other hand, the
Establishment Clause' requires that the government not favor
one religion over another. As a result, an inherent conflict
exists between these doctrines because when the government
allows private religious speech in a public forum it appears to
be sponsoring religion.
When these doctrines collide in the public school
context, it is imperative that lower courts and school districts
have intelligible guidelines. In the early school prayer cases,
the Supreme Court clearly embraced the doctrine of church-
state separation.' Commentators have argued that the
separationist ethos has survived best in the context of religious
exercises in public schools.! Because of the changes in the
makeup of the Supreme Court, school prayer issues have been
scrutinized using several different tests and rationales, further
exacerbating the situation. Recently, the American Bar
Association declared that "[for the past decade, the legal
status of student-led prayer has become the most contentious
of First Amendment questions, dividing school officials,
lawyers and judges."9 Sadly, the current Supreme Court in its
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe'" decision took a
step backwards in this important and volatile area of
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. 1 ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech...").
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. 1 ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion...").
6 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (Discussed infra Part I.A.).
'JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUR, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER
450 (1996).
This setting combines many of separationism's core concerns,
including the privatization of religion, the dangers of a divisive local
politics of religion, the role of common schools as unifying carriers of
shared aspirations and culture, and the threat to individual religious
liberty created by the compulsory character of education of the young.
Id.
'These tests are described infra Part L
'David G. Savage, OK to Pray in Public School?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2002, at 31.
10 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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jurisprudence by not providing clear guidance to lower courts
and school districts.
In Santa Fe, two families objected to the persistent
imposition of sectarian religious practices in the public schools
of Santa Fe, Texas. As a result, they sought injunctive relief
against the Santa Fe Independent School District to prevent it
from sponsoring or condoning religious acts at imminent
graduation exercises." They also alleged, inter alia, that the
district allowed students to deliver overtly Christian prayers
over the public address system at home football games.'
Although the Supreme Court correctly held the school district's
policy was unconstitutional, the Court utilized language and
principles from several different Establishment Clause tests.
Among the ramifications of the Court's analysis in Santa Fe, is
its failure to offer a cogent standard for analyzing the
constitutionality of school policies that allegedly violate the
Establishment Clause. In addition, the Court employed the
public forum doctrine which was created to govern the First
Amendment guarantees of individuals using publicly owned
property for free speech purposes. As Chief Justice Renhquist
acknowledged, "we [the Court] have repeatedly emphasized our
unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in
the [Establishment Clause] area."" Admittedly, the Court
cannot use the same test to evaluate every situation challenged
under the Establishment Clause. However, the Santa Fe
approach in this particular school prayer context left too many
unanswered questions including: (1) which Establishment
Clause test and/or principle, if any, was dispositive; (2) the
significance of a facial challenge on Establishment Clause
grounds; and (3) when speech endorsing religion is truly
private and constitutionally protected.
Unfortunately, these concerns materialized in two
Eleventh Circuit decisions, Chandler v. James" and Adler v.
Duval County School Board.5 After the Supreme Court granted
" See Respondents Brief at 43, Santa Fe v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (No. 99-
62), available at 2000 WL 140928.
:2 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295.
3 Id. at 319 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
14 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Chandler 1].
15 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) [hereinafterAdler 1].
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certiorari" and remanded Chandler to be decided in light of the
principles announced in Santa Fe, the Eleventh Circuit
maintained that "Santa Fe leaves unanswered, however, under
what circumstances religious speech in schools can be
considered private, and therefore, protected."' On remand, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the challenged Alabama statute
permitting student-initiated prayer by pronouncing the speech
protected under the guise of private speech. 8 Similarly, the
Court vacated the Adler decision and remanded it for further
consideration in light of Santa Fe.9 Like Chandler, the
Eleventh Circuit reinstated its judgment and upheld a policy
permitting high school seniors to vote whether a student could
deliver a message of that student's choosing as part of
graduation ceremonies." Unfortunately, the Court refused to
review the Adler ruling, thus causing greater confusion in this
area of law. Frustrated by the lack of clarity on this issue, the
lawyer challenging the Adler policy declared, "[tihere's one rule
for the 11' Circuit, one rule for the 5' Circuit and, in my
opinion, no rule on this issue for the rest of the country."2'
Because school districts and lower courts do not have
clear guidance on school prayer issues, Establishment Clause
jurisprudence may be inconsistently applied in such cases.
Moreover, school districts that disagree with the Supreme
Court's view of disallowing prayer at these school events may
subvert the Court's stance on this issue through devious
techniques. Therefore, it is imperative that the Court clarifies
the law and provides uniformity throughout the federal circuits
and the country. Part I of this Comment details the first school
prayer cases and the three different tests used in the
Establishment Clause area. Part II details the development of
the public forum doctrine because school districts argue that
this doctrine shields their policies under the guise of the Free
Speech Clause. Part III discusses the Santa Fe decision. Lastly,
Part IV examines the Supreme Court's analysis and the
fundamental problems in the Court's approach in Santa Fe,
16 Chandler v. Seigelman, 530 U.S. 1256 (2000).
17 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Chandler II].18 Id.
'9 Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 531 U.S. 801 (2001).
20 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Adler I].
21 Savage, supra note 9, at 31.
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Chandler, and Adler and proposes a two-step analysis for this
particular context. First, courts should apply forum analysis
and its categorical approach. Second, courts should conduct an
Establishment Clause inquiry using an "any reasonable
observer endorsement test" version of the endorsement test.
I. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING RELIGION
AND PRAYER IN SCHOOL
A. The School Prayer Cases
An examination of the freedom of religion guaranteed
by the First Amendment necessarily begins in 1947 with
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing.22 In that case, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New Jersey
statute and a school board resolution passed pursuant to it
which allowed parents of parochial students to be reimbursed
for the transportation of their children on buses operated by
the public transportation system.2 Despite the approval of the
statute and resolution, the decision was filled with strong
language extolling the virtues of the First Amendment.
Specifically, Justice Jackson declared in two sentences that
proved enormously influential as well as controversial, "the
First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state" and "[that wall must be kept high and impregnable."'
Almost fifteen years later, parents of public school
students looked to the strength of this "wall" to challenge the
constitutionality of a state law authorizing a school district to
direct the use of prayer in public schools and of a school
district's regulation ordering the recitation of a prayer.' In
Engel v. Vitale,26 the Court made clear that these prayers were
22330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23See id. at 17.
" Id. at 16.
2' See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962). The Board of Education
directed the following prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of the
teacher at the beginning of each school day: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our Country." Id. at 426.
26 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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in violation of the Establishment Clause because they were
composed by "governmental officials as part of a governmental
program to further religious beliefs."27 As a result, the Court
found that the constitutional prohibition against laws
respecting an establishment of religion must mean that "in this
country it is no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite
as part of a religious program carried on by government."28 The
Court articulated that the Constitution was adopted to avert
the dangers of a union of church and state. The Court further
stated, "one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the
individual to worship in his own way lay in the Government's
placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind
of prayer or one particular form of religious services."29 It did
not matter to the Court whether the prayer was
denominationally neutral or that its observance was voluntary,
for the Establishment Clause "rested on the belief that a union
of government and religion tended to destroy . . . and to
degrade religion." °  The Court also noted that the
Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the
historical fact that governmentally established religions and
religious persecution were closely related."1 The Court noted
that the Establishment Clause stood as an "expression of
principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its
'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate." 2 The Court
maintained that even though the Regent's prayer did not
compare "to the governmental encroachments upon religion
that occurred 200 years ago," it was significant enough to
violate the Establishment Clause."
2 7 Id. at 425.
28 id.
29 Id. at 429.
"See id. at 431. The court noted that the history of England and America
"showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of
religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect, and
even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs." Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
31 See id. at 433.
32 Id. at 432.
"See id. at 436. The Court quoted James Madison to emphasize this point:
It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. ...
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the
1296 [Vol. 67: 4
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Following Engel, the Court reinforced the "wall" when it
examined state action requiring schools to begin each day with
readings from the Bible in two companion cases. In School
District of Abington v. Schempp,' one set of plaintiffs, the
Schempp family, sued to enjoin the enforcement of a
Pennsylvania statute requiring "[a]t least ten verses from the
Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of
each public school on each school day."35 The Schempps claimed
that the religious doctrines of the Bible were contrary to their
religious beliefs and to their familial teaching.36 Although the
Pennsylvania statute did allow children to be excused from this
reading upon written request from their parent or guardian,
the plaintiffs believed that this would adversely affect the
children's relationships with their teachers and classmates. 7 In
the other case, plaintiffs Madalyn Murray and her son William
J. Murray III challenged a Baltimore City rule providing for
opening exercises in city schools that consisted primarily of
reading, without comment, a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or
the use of the Lord's Prayer.38 The Murrays, both professed
atheists, claimed that the rule violated their rights in religious
freedom by placing a premium on belief over nonbelief and by
subjecting their freedom of consent to the majority rule.3 9
Utilizing the principles and language of several cases
beginning with Everson, the Court reaffirmed that the
Establishment Clause does more than forbid governmental
preference of one religion over another."0 The Court re-
emphasized that "the first and most immediate purpose of the
Establishment Clause rested on the belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and to
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all Sects?
That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever?
Id. at 436.
34 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
35 Id. at 205.
" See id at 208.
37 See id
" Id. at 211.
39 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212.
40 See id at 216.
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degrade religion."" Like New York's program and policy in
Engel, the opening exercises were religious exercises imposed
by the State in violation of the First Amendment command
that the government remain strictly neutral without aiding or
opposing religion.
B. The Three Tests Used by the Court to Examine
Establishment Clause Violations
Following Everson and the school prayer cases, the
Supreme Court utilized different tests and rationales to decide
Establishment Clause conflicts. A study of Court decisions
reveals that three tests are used in modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
1. The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 the Court established a three-
prong test for determining whether a statute violates the
Establishment Clause. In this case, the Court addressed two
appeals challenging Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes
that provided state aid to church-related elementary and
secondary schools. Pennsylvania had a statutory program that
reimbursed private schools for the cost of teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular
subjects.4" Rhode Island's statute directly paid teachers in
private elementary schools a supplement of fifteen percent of
their annual salary.4 Acknowledging the absence of precisely
stated constitutional prohibitions in this area, the Court set
out to unify the tests developed by it over several years. The
Court found that the Establishment Clause was created to
protect against the evils of sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.45 Thus,
the Court created a tri-partite framework to determine
whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause. First, the
", Id. at 221.
42 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
' Id. at 607.
4Id.
5 Id. at 612.
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statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion."46
When applying the test, the Court relied primarily on
the third prong to find the statutes unconstitutional. It found
that both statutes involved several areas of excessive
entanglement between government and religion. Under the
Rhode Island statute, the state had to inspect and evaluate the
religious content of a religious organization.47 Likewise, the
Pennsylvania statute gave rise to entanglements between
church and state with the same restrictions and surveillance
necessary to ensure that teachers played a strictly non-
ideological role.48 In addition, the Court was concerned with the
entanglement presented by the divisive political potential of
these state programs. Lastly, the Court concluded that "the
Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for
the individual, the family and the institutions of private choice,
and that while some involvement and entanglement are
inevitable, lines must be drawn."49
Although the Supreme Court has not formally
repudiated the Lemon test, many justices have criticized it.50
Because the test is disjunctive, courts are free to choose which
prong to apply when analyzing Establishment Clause
challenges.
2. The Endorsement Test
In an influential concurring opinion in Lynch v.
Donnelly,"1 Justice O'Connor created the "endorsement test" to
serve as a guide for Establishment Clause challenges. In
4
' Id. at 612-13.
4 7 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
4" See id at 620.49 1d. at 625.
60 One memorable example was Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). He
graphically stated, "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again... ." Id. at 398 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
51 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Lynch, the Court held that the city's inclusion of a nativity
scene in its Christmas display was constitutional under the
Establishment Clause. Writing separately, Justice O'Connor
suggested an approach to clarify the Court's Establishment
Clause doctrine. Justice O'Connor urged that "the proper
inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon. . is whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion." 2 Under the effect prong of the Lemon
test, she found that "what is crucial is that a government
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion." 3
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union,54 the Court applied Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
when it evaluated the constitutionality of two recurring holiday
displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion found that Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch provided a sound analytical
framework for Establishment Clause cases."5 Adopting this
framework, Justice Blackmun pointed out the test's guiding
principles. First, any endorsement of religion is invalid because
it "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community."" Second, "the
effect of the display depends upon the message that the
government's practice communicates" and "what viewers may
fairly understand to be the purpose of the display. 5 7 In this
regard, "every government practice must be judged in its
unique circumstances to determine whether it endorses
religion."58 Therefore, under this framework, the Court must
ascertain whether "the challenged governmental action is
sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the
nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious
2 Id. at 691.RId. at 692.
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
See id. at 595.
Id.6
7 id.
68 Id.
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choices."'9 To determine this, the Court found that the
constitutionality of the display's effect "must [ I be judged
according to the standard of a 'reasonable observer'." 0 Using
these considerations, the Court held that it "is not 'sufficiently
likely' that residents of Pittsburgh will perceive the combined
display . ..as an 'endorsement' or 'disapproval' ...of their
individual religious choices." 1 Therefore, the Court held that
"the city's overall display must be understood as conveying the
city's secular recognition of different traditions for celebrating
the winter-holiday season."62
3. The Coercion Test
Lastly, in Lee v. Weisman," the Court enunciated the
"coercion test" for analyzing Establishment Clause challenges.
It held that (1) the principle that government may
accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede
the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment
Clause; and (2) it is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which establishes a state religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.r
Because the facts and questions addressed in Lee are
closely analogous to Santa Fe, an in-depth look at this case is
helpful. In Lee, the Court addressed whether including clerical
members who offer prayers as part of an official school
graduation ceremony was consistent with the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment.65 The public school system of
Providence, Rhode Island had a policy that permitted
principals to invite members of the clergy to give invocations
and benedictions at middle school and high school
graduations.66 It was customary for Providence school officials
'Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597.
o Id. at 620.
61 1d. at 619.
" Id. at 620.
"505 U.S. 577 (1992).
64 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302.
6Lee, 505 U.S. at 580.
6See id at 581.
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to provide invited clergy with a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines
for Civic Occasions."67 A middle school principal, Robert E. Lee,
invited Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to deliver prayers at the
graduation exercises.68 Lee gave Gutterman the pamphlet
before the graduation and advised him that the invocation and
benediction should be nonsectarian.69  Attendance by
graduating students at all Providence middle schools and high
schools was voluntary.
The Court began its analysis by indicating that it was
not required to reconsider its decision in Lemon, because the
government involvement with religious activity in this case
was so pervasive that it created a "state-sponsored and state-
directed religious exercise in a public school."71 The Court noted
that although the government may accommodate the free
Id. at 581. The National Conference of Christians and Jews prepared the
pamphlet. The Guidelines recommended that public prayers at nonsectarian civic
ceremonies be composed with "inclusiveness and sensitivity" though they acknowledge
that "prayer of any kind may be inappropriate on some civic occasions." I&o
" Rabbi Gutterman belonged to the Temple Beth El in Providence. See Lee,
505 U.S. at 58L
6Rabbi Gutterman's prayers were as follows:
Invocation:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where
diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we
thank You. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it. For
the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow
up to guard it. For the political process of America in which all its
citizens may participate, for its court system where all may seek
justice we thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn to
it in trust. For the destiny of America we thank You. May the
graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help
to share it. May our aspirations for our country and for these young
people, who are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.
Benediction:
o God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity
for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an
important milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and
administrators who helped prepare them. The graduates now need
strength and guidance for the future, help them to understand that we
are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive
to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk
humbly. We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining
us and allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion. Amen."
Id.
70 See id. at 583.
71 See id. at 587.
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exercise of religion, it must abide by the limitations of the
Establishment Clause.72 The Court found that Lee's decisions
to have an invocation and benediction; choose the religious
participant; and provide a Rabbi with guidelines and advice
were troubling and attributable to the State.7" The Court
maintained that these decisions violated the principle of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence because "it is no part of
the business of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government."74
In addition, the Court maintained that the Religion
Clauses stand for the principle that religious beliefs and
expression are too precious to be either "proscribed or
prescribed by the State."75 Instead, "the preservation and
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility
and a choice committed to the private sphere.. . 76In addition,
the Court maintained that while the efforts of the school
officials to find common ground were a good-faith attempt to
recognize common aspects of religion, prior case law prohibited
school officials from participating in this act.77 The Court then
determined that "the degree of school involvement here made it
clear that the graduation prayers bore the imprint of the State
and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable
position."78
The Court then concentrated on the ceremonies' effect
on students. Here, the Supreme Court rejected as formalistic
the argument that the graduation was voluntary.79 The Court
recognized that graduation is an important and valuable
experience for students and their families. 0 Moreover, the
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. The Court maintained that "the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a state religion or
religious faith or tends to do so." Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)).
'See ic. at 587-88.
7
4 1d. at 588. (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 425).75Id. at 589.
76 Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
"See id. at 590.
78 id.
7See id. at 591. The Court declared, "to say teenage student has a real choice
not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the extreme." Id, at 591.
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 591.
130320021
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Court maintained that while these religious prayers would be
important to some students, these same prayers would amount
to religious conformity with other students.8
Further, the Court rejected arguments comparing the
public school system to sessions of a state legislature." The
Court noted that at graduation teachers and principals must
and do retain "a high degree of control over the precise
contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the
movements, the dress, and the decorum of the students.' 3 The
Court then found that "[in this atmosphere the state-imposed
character of an invocation and benediction by clergy selected by
the school combine to make the prayer a state-sanctioned
religious exercise in which the student was left with no
alternative but to submit."84
Lastly, the Court acknowledged that it is not
constitutional to exclude religion from every aspect of public
life.85 Further, the Court recognized that there are instances
where religious values, practices, and purposes will interact
with public schools and their students.86 However, the Court
maintained that these were different issues. The Court found
that here it faced the sole question of "whether a religious
exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony in
circumstances where . . . young graduates who object are
induced to conform."87 Thus, the Court held that the invocation
and benediction given by the Rabbi at the commencement
ceremony were forbidden by the Establishment Clause.88
8' Id. at 595-96. The Court further elaborated, "[tihe Constitution forbids the
State to exact religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own
high school graduation." Id. at 596.
2 See id. at 596-97. Here, the Court distinguished its decision in Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where it decided that clergy-delivered prayer before a
session of a state legislature was constitutional. The court explained that "[t]he
atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state legislature where adults are free to
enter and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons cannot compare
with the constraining potential of the one school event most important for the student
to attend." Lee, 505 U.S. at 596-97.
8Id. at 597.
8 Id.
8' See id. at 598.
6 See id. at 599.87 Lee, 505 U.S. at 599.
88 See id.
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4. Analysis of Tests
Because of the changing make-up of the Supreme Court,
different tests and rationales have been applied to
Establishment Clause challenges. Throughout the 1970s, the
Court utilized the Lemon framework and its separationist
vision.89 The Supreme Court has not formally renounced the
Lemon test, but no majority has relied on it to invalidate any
practice since 1985.90 In Santa Fe, Chief Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that "we have even gone so far as to state that it
has never been binding on us."9' Also, the Chief Justice
declared that in Lee the Court "mentioned, but did not feel
compelled to apply the Lemon test."92
In 1989, a five-Justice majority accepted a version of the
endorsement test.93 However, the replacement of Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and White with Justices Souter, Thomas
and Ginsburg creates doubt whether the endorsement test can
still command a majority.' In Lee, a narrow majority of the
Court enunciated the coercion test to strike down the
graduation policy. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy
expressed his view that coercion is a necessary element of an
Establishment Clause violation.95
Although the Santa Fe Court claimed to rely on the
principles of Lee, the language of the endorsement test
appeared throughout the Santa Fe opinion.9" In addition, the
Court employed two of Lemon's prongs to analyze the issue.'
Thus, -the Court utilized different principles and different tests
to analyze this specific Establishment Clause area. Such an
"See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 230, 236 (1993).
9See GARVEY & SCHAUR, supra note 7, at 525.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 319 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 320.
See Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
See Lupu, supra note 89, at 240.
" See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (finding "[iut is beyond dispute that, at a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise....").
96 See supra Part IV.B. (discussing the mixing and matching of different
Establishment Clause tests).
97 The Court discussed the secular legislative purpose prong and the
entanglement prong.
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approach fails to provide a coherent analysis for circuits
confronting this issue. The Court's analysis of the
Establishment Clause challenges should provide clearer
guidance to lower courts.
II. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
When the Santa Fe School District defended the
constitutionality of its pre-game football policy, it argued that
its policy permitted private student speech, not government
speech.98 In making this argument, the school district relied on
the Free Speech Clause cases that protected religious speech
under the public forum doctrine.99 As a result, the Court
examined these cases and found that "an individual's
contribution to government-created forums was not
government speech.""°  The Court found these cases
distinguishable, but stated "a conclusion that the District had
created a public forum would shed light on whether the
resulting speech is public or private.. .""0 Therefore, it is likely
that school districts in the future will argue their policies
create public forums and only authorize protected private
speech.0 2 Thus, it is necessary to examine the development of
the public forum doctrine analysis and its effects on student led
prayer in this particularized area.
A. The Development of the Public Forum Doctrine Analysis
Because the First Amendment cannot guarantee the
individual an absolute right to use publicly owned property for
expressive purposes, the Court developed the public forum
98 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 203.
See Petitioner's Brief at 45-46, Santa Fe v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (No. 99-
62), available at 1999 WL 1269325. The petitioners argued that the Free Speech
Clause precludes discrimination against religious speech and relied on Pinette, Lamb's
Chapel, and Rosenberger. These cases are discussed, infra, in this section.
'00 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302.
"'1 See id. at 303 n.13 (2001).
102 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated its en banc opinion that found a
school district policy very similar to that in Santa Fe "can be analogized to a line of
open forum cases" including Mergens, Pinette and Lamb's Chapel. See Adler v. Duval
County School Board, 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2001), discussed, infra Part IV D.
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analysis. This analysis has evolved along two interrelated
tracks. One line of analysis governs streets and parks and the
other analysis governs all other publicly-owned property.
In United States v. Grace,'0' the Court held that the
government's ability to restrict expression on public sidewalks
is very limited. The Court found that the government may
enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions only if
the restrictions are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve
a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication.'" Lastly, the Court
stated it may absolutely prohibit "a particular type of
expression" only if the prohibition is "narrowly drawn to
accomplish a compelling governmental interest." 5
Under modern public forum doctrine, the Supreme
Court takes a categorical approach. As a result, the critical
issue is whether the public place to which access is being
sought is a public forum. In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n," the Court identified in great detail
the three different types of forums. These principles were re-
affirmed fifteen years later in Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes.
0 7
In Perry, the Court noted that the existence of a right of
access to public property and the standards to evaluate
limitations depended on the character of the property at
issue.'08 The first type of forum is the "quintessential public
forum" where the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity.0 9 The Court noted that when the state
wanted to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that
its regulation was necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."0
103 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
10 See id. at 177 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
105 Id.
106 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
10 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
'
08 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
'09 Id. These places are by long tradition or by government fiat devoted to
assembly and debate such as streets and parks which "have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."
"" Id. at 45.
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The second type of forum is the "designated" or "limited
public forum," which is public property that the state opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.' This
type of forum is "created by purposeful governmental action.""
In determining whether the state has transformed its property
into a designated public forum, the court looks at two factors.
First, the court looks to governmental intent. Here, "the
government does not create a [designated] public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public
discourse.""' Therefore, "the court has looked to the policy and
practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to
designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate
as a public forum.""4 Other indicia of intent. 5 include the
nature of the state property and its compatibility with
expressive activity. Second, the court examines the extent of
the use granted. In order to create the designated forum, the
"government must allow 'general access' to or 'indiscriminate
use' of the forum in question by the general public, or by
particular speakers, or for the discussion of designated
topics.""6
Although the state is not required to indefinitely retain
the open character of the forum, as long as it does so, however,
it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum."' As a result, "[r]easonable time, place and
manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based
prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling
state interest."""
The third type of forum is the "non-public forum." This
is "public property which is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication.""' Here, "[i]n addition to time,
place, and manner regulations, the state may reserve the
III See id.
112 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
"' Id. at 677.
4 id.
See id. at 673.
Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 820 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
... See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
"8 Id. at 46.
19 See id. at 46.
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forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise,
as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view.
120
B. The Interaction between the Public Forum Doctrine and
the Establishment Clause
In some situations, a state entity may exclude a
religious group or speaker from a public forum based on the
content of the group's intended speech. The state entity will
claim a compelling state interest in maintaining separation of
church and state in compliance with the Establishment Clause.
This inevitably creates a tension between the public forum
doctrine and the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court
faced this situation in 1981 in the case of Widmar v. Vincent.1
21
Here, the Court considered whether a state university,
which made its facilities generally available for the activities of
registered student groups, could close its facilities to a
registered student group for religious worship and religious
discussion." The University of Missouri at Kansas City
encouraged the activities of student organizations, officially
recognized over one hundred student groups, and provided
facilities for the meetings of registered organizations. m For
four years, a registered religious group named Cornerstone
regularly conducted meetings in university facilities. U In 1977,
the university informed the students that they were no longer
allowed to meet in university buildings because of a regulation
prohibiting the use of university buildings or grounds "for
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."'25 As a
result, eleven student-members of Cornerstone brought suit
120 See id.; Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
121 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
122 Id. at 264.
12 See id. at 265. The students paid an activity fee per semester to help defray
the costs.
124 See id. The group was an organization of evangelical Christian students
from various denominational backgrounds. The meetings attracted up to 125 students
and included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views. See
id.
12 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
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alleging that the university's discrimination against religious
activity and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of
religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 6
First, the Court examined the university's policy under
the public forum doctrine. It found that the university had
created a limited public forum generally open for use by
student groups which created an obligation to justify its
discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional
norms.127 The Court opined that the university discriminated
against this group based on the group's desire to use a
generally open forum to engage in religious worship and
discussion." Therefore, the Court stated that in order to justify
this content-based exclusion, the university must show that its
regulation "is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' In this
case, the university claimed that the compelling state interest
was maintaining strict separation of church and state under
the federal and Missouri constitutions!" The Court agreed that
the university had a compelling interest in complying with its
constitutional obligations.' But, the Court refused to find that
an "equal access" policy would always be incompatible with its
Establishment Clause cases. Instead, the Court held that "a
policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass"
the three-pronged Lemon test.'
3 2
Applying the Lemon test, the Court quickly concluded
that the first secular purpose prong and the third
entanglement prong were "clearly met."33 As to the second
126 See id. at 266.
127 See id. at 268. In a footnote, the Court recognized that prior cases have
recognized two important principles applied in the classroom setting. First, the Court
noted students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the campus,
and that the denial to particular groups of use of campus facilities for meetings and
other appropriate purposes must be subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate to
any form of prior restraint. Second, the Court noted that First Amendment rights must
be analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. See id.
128 See id.
129 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
130 See id.
... See id. at 271.132 Id.
123 Id. at 271. The Court noted that the District Court and the Court of
Appeals both held that an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against
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prong, however, the Court explained in more detail how the
limited public forum would not have the primary effect of
advancing religion. The Court maintained that because the
university opened its facilities for use by student groups, the
focus was whether it could now exclude groups because of the
content of their speech.134 The Court explained that although
religious organizations may benefit from the forum, these
"incidental" benefits did not violate the prohibition against the
"primary advancement" of religion.15  In making this
determination, the Court found two factors especially relevant.
First, the open forum in a public university did not confer any
"imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. 3 6
Second, the forum was available to a broad class of
nonreligious as well as religious speakers.'37 Thus, the Court
held that the advancement of religion would not be the forum's
"primary effect" and struck down the university's policy as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.' 38
Several years later, in Board of Education of Westside
Community v. Mergens,"3 9 the Court considered whether the
federal Equal Access Act violated the Establishment Clause."
In Westside public High School, the school board encouraged
the creation of student-run clubs and other organizations as a
vital part of the education program.' Students trying to form
clubs presented their request to a school official who
determined whether the club's goals and objectives were
consistent with school board policies. In 1985, a student
religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with
religion. See id.
'4 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273. In a footnote, the Court explained that this
case is different from cases in which religious groups claim that the denial of facilities
not available to other groups deprives them of their rights under the Free Exercise
Clause. Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, and the
claim to use that forum does not rest solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise
Clause. Instead, the claim implicates First Amendment rights of speech and
association. See id.
'35 Id. at 274.
1Id.
7 See id at 275.
... Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275.
139 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
14See id. at 231-47.
. See id. at 231.
4 See id. at 232.
2002] 1311
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
requested permission to form a Christian club at the school.
The proposed club would have the same privileges, terms, and
conditions as other Westside student groups, except that the
club would not have a faculty sponsor."' The request was
denied because the policy required clubs to have a faculty
sponsor and the club would violate the Establishment
Clause.' As a result, the students sought injunctive relief
alleging that the refusal to permit the proposed club to meet at
the school violated the federal Equal Access Act'45 and the First
Amendment. In response, the defendants argued that the
Equal Access Act did not apply to the school and that, if it did
apply, it violated the Establishment Clause.'46 The United
States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the Equal
Access Act."'
The Court held that the denial of the request to form
the Christian club violated the Equal Access Act. 148 The Court
rested its conclusion on statutory grounds and did not decide
whether the First Amendment required the same result.14 1 The
Court found that the logic of its decision in Widmar applied to
the Equal Access Act and secondary school students.150 The
Court opined that the Act's prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of "political, philosophical or other speech as well
as religious speech is a sufficient basis for meeting the secular
purpose prong of the Lemon test."5' The Court also found that
because the Act on its face granted equal access to both secular
'43 See 'id. According to the student, the club's purpose would have been to
permit the students to read and discuss the Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray
together. Also, membership would be "voluntary and open to all students." Mergens,
496 U.S. at 232.
'" See id. at 233.
'45 See id. The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071 et. seq. (1994), prohibits
"public secondary schools that receive federal financial assistance and that maintain a
'limited open forum' from denying 'equal access' to students who wish to meet within
the forum on the basis of the content of the speech at such meetings." Mergens, 496
U.S. at 233.
146 Id.
147 Id.
"' See id. at 247. This statute, passed in 1984, extended the reasoning of
Widmar to public secondary schools. See id. at 235.
:49 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247.
'0 See id. at 247 (finding that a similar equal access policy at the university
level was constitutional under the Lemon test).
"' Id. at 248.
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and religious speech the "Act's purpose was not to endorse or
disapprove of religion." " '
Petitioners argued that the Act had the primary effect
of advancing religion. "3 The Court disagreed. First, the Court
noted that "there is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free
Speech and Exercise Clauses protect."" Further, the Court
opined that secondary school students were mature enough to
understand that a school does not endorse or support student
speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.'55
Second, the Court found that the Act expressly limited
participation by school officials at meetings of student religious
groups and that any such meetings were to be held during
noninstructional time.5 6 Lastly, the Court found that "the
broad spectrum of officially recognized student clubs at
Westside, and the fact that Westside students were free to
initiate and organize additional student clubs counteracted any
message or official endorsement of or preference for religion." "7
Finally, petitioners claimed that by complying with the
Act's requirements, the school risked excessive entanglement
between government and religion.' The Court rejected this
argument because the Act mandated that faculty monitors
could not participate in any religious meetings and school
officials could not promote, lead, or participate in any such
meeting.'59 The Court held that a denial of equal access to
religious speech might create "greater entanglement problems
in the form of invasive monitoring to prevent religious speech
at meetings at which such speech may occur."6 ' Thus, the
Court held that the Equal Access Act did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
152 Id.
See id. at 249.
: Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
5 See id. To back up this proposition, the Court noted that Congress
specifically rejected the argument that high school students are likely to confuse an
equal access policy with state sponsorship of religion. See id.
" See id. at 251.
157 Id.
1 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252.
"9 See id. at 253.
16 Id.
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In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
District,161 the Court invalidated a school district rule that
permitted after-school social, civic, and recreational uses of
school property, but prohibited the use of such property for
religious purposes.'62  In Lamb's Chapel," an evangelical
church group was twice denied permission to use school
facilities by the school district." The church brought suit
challenging the denial as a violation of the Free Speech and
Assembly Clauses, the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.6 '
Both the district court and court of appeals rejected the
church's argument that the district had opened its property for
a wide variety of communicative purposes creating a
designated public forum. Finding that it did not have to rule on
whether the courts below were correct on the forum issue, the
Court analyzed the case as a nonpublic forum. 6  Next, the
Court focused on the court of appeals' conclusion that Rule 7's
total ban on using district property for religious purposes was
reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Here, the Court found that
the critical question regarding Rule 7 was whether it
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint to permit school
property to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues except those dealing with the subject matter from
a religious standpoint.'67 In this regard, the Court found that
the district impermissibly denied the application because the
'61 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
162 See id. at 387. The Board of Center Moriches Union Free School District
was empowered under New York Education Law § 414 to adopt reasonable regulations
for the use of school property for ten specified purposes when the property was not in
use for school purposes. The Board issued rules and regulations which allowed for only
two of the purposes listed in § 414. Rule 7 provided that the school premises shall not
be used by any group for religious purposes. See id.
163 508 U.S. 384.
164 See id. at 385. The District denied the first application saying that "this
film does appear to be church related." The second application was denied using
identical language. Id. at 388.
'
65 See id. at 387.
'6 See id. at 392. The Court cited Perry for the principle that 'control over
access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so
long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral." Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)).
'
67 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
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presentation would have been from a religious perspective."
The district argued that to permit its property to be used for
religious purposes would be an establishment of religion
forbidden by the First Amendment.169 The Court rejected this
argument by utilizing the Widmar decision.70 The Court found
that the fear of violating the Establishment Clause was
unfounded because the showing of the film series: (1) would not
have been during school hours, (2) would not have been
sponsored by the school, and (3) would have been open to the
public, not just to church members. 7 Therefore, the Court
held, there would be no danger that the community would
think that the district was endorsing religion and any benefit
to religion would be incidental.'72 Lastly, the Court quickly and
summarily stated that there would not have been an
establishment of religion under the Lemon test.
173
In the cases above, the Court allowed religious speech to
occur in public schools. However, these school districts took
affirmative steps to open its facilities to several different types
of speakers and speech. Once these facilities were open for
general access, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the districts'
content-based exclusion of religious speech. Although the
schools claimed a compelling governmental interest in
separating church and state, the Court upheld these policies
under the Establishment Clause. Therefore, one can see that
the Court is not engaged in balancing free speech interests
against the Establishment Clause. Instead, the Court is
16' See id at 394. The Court found inconsistent with prior precedent that
"although a speaker may be excluded from a non-public forum if he wishes to address a
topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum... or if he is not a member of
the class of speakers for whose benefit the forum was created . . . the government
violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the
point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject." Id.16 See id. at 394.
170 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394. The Court recognized that the Court
held that permitting use of university property for religious purposes under the open
access policy involved there would not be incompatible with the Court's Establishment
Clause cases. See idl
171 See id. at 395.
i See id.
'73 See id. The Court simply stated that "the challenged governmental action
has a secular purpose, does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, and does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion."
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
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demonstrating its contempt for content-based exclusions in a
particular forum opened for expressive activities. Furthermore,
because the public forum doctrine implicates strict scrutiny,
one can point to Professor Gerald Gunther's characterization of
this standard of review as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."' 4
As a result, school districts have an incentive to claim
their pre-game policies are protected under these cases. But,
before granting this protection, lower courts must remember
why creating a limited public forum avoids many of the evils of
uniting church and state. First, the schools' policies discussed
above allowed for equal access to the facilities for a broad range
of speech. Second, the type of religious speech was not
subjected to a vote. Therefore, students did not decide whether
the facilities would be used for Buddhist, Christian, or other
religious expressive activity. Third, the religious groups
utilized these facilities privately for their own expressive
activity. As a result, the school facilities were not filled with
unwilling students subjected to different religious views. These
students were not faced with the inevitable fate of attending a
school function and being subjected to religious viewpoints by.
the organs of the state. Instead, the students uninterested in
these views did not have to attend the meetings. Therefore, it
is evident that pre-game ceremonies do not possess these
important safeguards and characteristics. It is imperative that
lower courts understand when a public forum doctrine is
created and its implications. Thus, lower courts must not
bestow protection on unworthy forums ill suited for the
expressive activity of several different speakers.
174 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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III. SANTA FE V. DOE
A. Facts
The Santa Fe Independent School District ("SFISD") is
a political subdivision of Texas,175 responsible for the education
of more than 4,000 students in a small community in the
southern part of the state.176 The respondents, the Does, were
two sets of current or former students and their mothers. 7 One
family is Mormon and the other is Catholic. 
7
In April 1995, the Does moved for a temporary
restraining order to prevent the SFISD from violating the
Establishment Clause at the upcoming graduation exercises. 9
In their complaint, the Does alleged that the SFISD engaged in
many proselytizing practices including: (1) promoting
attendance at a Baptist revival meeting; (2) encouraging
membership in religious clubs; (3) chastising children who held
minority religious beliefs; and (4) distributing Gideon Bibles on
school premises. 8 ' In addition, the Does alleged that the SFISD
permitted students to read Christian invocations and
benedictions from the stage at graduation ceremonies and to
deliver overtly Christian prayers over the public address
system at home football games.' 8'
In May 1995, the district court entered an interim
order. 82 First, the order provided that for the impending
graduation a "non-denominational prayer" consisting of "an
invocation and/or benediction" could be presented by a senior
student or students selected by members of the graduating
class." Second, the text of the prayer was to be determined by
'
75 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295.
17, See id. at 295. This includes the Santa Fe High School, two primary schools,
an intermediate school, and the junior high school.
'77 See id. In order to protect the respondents from intimidation and
harassment, the district court allowed them to litigate anonymously (as "Doe").
'78 See id.
'7 Id. at 295.
See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295.
181 See id.
182 See id.
3 See id
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the students, without scrutiny or preapproval by school
officials.8" Finally, references to particular religious figures,
such as Mohammed, Jesus, or Buddha, would be permitted, "as
long as the general thrust of the prayer is nonproselytizing. " 185
In response to the order, the SFISD adopted policies for
the graduation ceremonies ("July policy" or "graduation policy")
and the football games ("August policy" or "football game
policy").'86 Both policies authorized two student elections. The
first election determined whether "invocations" should be
delivered and the second selected the spokesperson to deliver
them.187 Similar to the graduation policy, the football game
policy contained two parts. First, an initial statement omitted
any requirement that the content of the invocation be
"nonsectarian and nonproseltyising."' 8' Second, the football
game policy contained a fallback provision that automatically
added that limitation if the preferred policy was enjoined.'89
On August 31, 1995, the district's high school students
voted and chose to allow a student to say a prayer at varsity
football games."O Then, in a separate election, they selected a
student to deliver the prayer. 9' Following these events, the
SFISD enacted an October policy, similar to the August
policy."' One change was that it omitted the word "prayer"
from its title. Although changes were made to the August
policy, the school did not conduct another election to supersede
the results of the August policy.
193
In an order, the district court precluded enforcement of
the October policy without the portion requiring "any message
and/or invocation delivered by a student must be nonsectarian
and nonproselytizing."" Applying the coercion test, the court
held that the graduation prayers "appealed 'to distinctly
Christian beliefs,' and that delivering a prayer 'over the
'" Id. at 294.
'8 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294.
"8 See id. at 296.
18 Id.
18 Id.
See id. at 296.
"'Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 296.
191 Id.
192 See id. at 298.
193 Id.
' Id. at 299.
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school's public address system prior to each football and
baseball games coerces student participation in religious
events.'"' 9 Subsequently, both parties appealed. SFISD argued
that the enjoined portion of the October policy was
permissible.'96 Whereas, the Does argued that both alternatives
violated the Establishment Clause.
197
B. The Fifth Circuit Opinion
When Santa Fe reached the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, it was not a case of first impression. In Jones v. Clear
Creek Independent School District,'18  the Fifth Circuit
established a rule that student-led prayer is permitted as part
of a school's program at graduation if it is approved by vote of
the students and if it is nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.
After this decision, Mississippi attempted to codify the Clear
Creek prayer policy and apply it throughout the public schools.
Its statute authorized "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-
initiated voluntary prayer at all school related events, whether
compulsory or noncompulsory." 9  However, a federal district
court entered an injunction against implementation of the
statute in all its applications except graduation."0 After an
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed and declined to reconsider
the Clear Creek decision.20'
Although the Fifth Circuit endorsed its Clear Creek
policy at graduations, it distinguished athletic events. In Doe v.
Duncanville Independent School District,20 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a preliminary injunction against school-encouraged
prayer "during curricular or extra-curricular activities,
including before, during, or after school-related sporting
events."2 3 In a later appeal, the Duncanville school district
... See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 299.
s See id
'9 See id.
198 977 F.2d. 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
199 MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-B-4.1(2) (1986).
200 See Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss.
1994), affd 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996).
"'See Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 280.
202 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993).
21 Id. at 163.
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relied on Clear Creek to attack the provision of the injunction
forbidding school employees from supervising or participating
in prayer initiated by students.Y In affirming the injunction,
the Fifth Circuit held "that high school graduation is a
significant, once-in-a-lifetime event," and that the athletic
events were "a setting that is far less solemn and
extraordinary. "
2
15
Under this precedent, the Fifth Circuit analyzed
SFISD's July policy and discussed: (1) whether the July policy
was designed to solemnize its graduation ceremony and thus
satisfy the Lemon test's secular purpose requirement;20°(2)
whether without the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
restrictions SFISD's modified Clear Creek prayer policy fail
Lemon's primary effect prong;2°7 (3) whether SFISD's prayer
policy violate the endorsement test because the government
has appeared to take a position on questions of religious belief
or has conveyed a message that religion is favored, preferred,
or promoted over other beliefs;208 (4) whether the SFISD policy
violate the coercion test;29 (5) whether the SFISD through its
July policy created a limited public forum;20 and (6) whether
the Clear Creek prayer policy's "nonsectarian" and
nonproselytizing" requirement can be extended to football
games through the SFISD's October policy.
211
In its secular purpose analysis under Lemon, the court
began by noting that deference must be paid to a government's
articulation of a secular purpose. However, the court cautioned
that a government's statement of secular purpose cannot be a
mere "sham."2 12 With this in mind, the court examined the July
policy and its effects on the graduation ceremony. First, the
court stated that the prayers would alter the tone of the
2o4 Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).
205 Id. at 406-07.
206 See Doe v. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d 806, 815 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Doe].
207 See id. at 816. The court labeled SFISD's policy a modified Clear Creek
prayer policy because the policy did not limit speakers to nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing invocations and benedictions. Most of the opinion was dedicated to
SFISD's attack on the Clear Creek requirements.
2 8 Id. at 817.
209 id.210 Id. at 819.
2" Doe, 168 F.3d at 822.
212 Id. at 816.
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graduation ceremony and shift the focus away from the
students and the secular purpose of the graduation to the
religious content of the speaker's prayers.213 Second, the court
determined that permitting the recitation of prayers would
polarize and politicize the event.214 Finally, the court stated
that sectarian and proselytizing prayers would alter the
character of the event and possibly disrupt it.2"5 As a result, the
court rejected the possibility that permitting students to
deliver sectarian and proselytizing prayer would further a
solemnizing effect.
Under Lemon's second prong, the court opined that
without the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing restrictions,
SFISD's modified Clear Creek policy failed Lemon's primary
effect prong. First, the court noted that in the context of public
school children, it is important to ensure that a practice does
not convey a message of religious endorsement or
disapproval.2 6 Second, the court dismissed the importance of
the student vote because the students could conceivably
designate a formal religious representative to deliver a "full-
fledged, fire-and-brimstone, Bible or Koran-quoting, sectarian
sermonette (in the dress for a prolonged invocation or
benediction) at graduation."217
Because the Lemon test is disjunctive, the court did not
address Lemon's third prong. However, the court continued its
analysis of SFISD's policy. It rejected the notion that, because
the ultimate choice was the students', "the sermonette would
not facially bear the government's imprimatur." 8 The court
was not persuaded because the prayers would be: (1) delivered
to a government-organized audience; (2) by government-owned
appliance and equipment; (3) on government controlled
property; and (4) at a government-sponsored event.2 9 Finally,
the court concluded that a message was conveyed that
government endorsed religion, including a particular form of
religion, because the school permitted sectarian and
213 See id
214 See id
215 See i&
21
r See Doe, 168 F.3d at 816.1
' Id. at 817.
218 Id.
219 id.
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proselytizing prayers. 22' Here, it seems the court utilized
principles of the endorsement test as well as dictum from Lee
when it discussed the "government's imprimatur." Thus, the
court mixed and matched Establishment Clause jurisprudence
to strike down the policy.
Next, the court moved to a troublesome rendition of the
endorsement test analysis. The court summarily asserted that
due to these same reasons, the SFISD's policy "obviously"
violated the endorsement test.221 Here, it seems the court
opined that in its discussion of the two Lemon prongs and
allusions to Lee dictum that the policy clearly violated the
endorsement test. Then, the court sadly asserted
[Hiaving concluded that student-selected, student-given, sectarian,
proselytizing invocations and benedictions at high school
graduations violate both the Lemon test and the endorsement test,
we are not required to determine that such public school prayer
policies also run afoul of the Coercion test to hold them antithetical
to the Establishment Clause.
22 2
The court did not "[address] . . .whether SFISD's policy
violates the Coercion Test."22 These statements are upsetting
because they prove that lower courts can utilize any
Establishment Clause test they desire to justify their results.
Moreover, this clearly shows a lack of uniformity and clear
guidelines. Although the Santa Fe Court clearly supported the
coercion test, the Fifth Circuit ignored the test and its
principles. Instead, the court rested its decision on the policies'
failure to prohibit "sectarian and proselytizing" prayers.
Because it lacked these elements, the court utilized Lemon by
stating that SFISD's July policy lacked a secular purpose and
had the primary effect of advancing and unconstitutionally
endorsing religion. 4
In its public forum analysis, the court considered
whether SFISD's July policy survives constitutional scrutiny
because it created a limited public forum.m First, the court
220 See id.
... Doe, 168 F.3d at 818.
222 Id. (emphasis added).
223 Id.
224 See id.
225 See id. at 819-21.
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quickly declared that the graduation ceremony is "quite
obviously not a traditional public forum." Therefore, the court
addressed whether the SFISD's commencement program
constituted a government designated public forum. In
concluding that the state did not transform its property into
designated public forum, the court examined (1) governmental
intent and (2) the extent of the use grantedY6
The court first found that SFISD's policy clearly did not
meet the test of government intent. First, the policy's character
and history did not make the ceremony, in general, nor the
invocation and benediction portions, in particular, appropriate
fora for such public discourse. 7 Second, graduation ceremonies
are not the place for presentations on topics of public concern." s
Lastly, the court reasoned that a graduation ceremony
comprised one activity which is singular in purpose, unlike a
debate or other venue for the exchange of competing
viewpoints. 9
When examining the extent of free speech use, the court
asserted that SFISD did not grant general access to a class of
speakers at its graduation ceremony because only a limited
number of speakers were chosen to deliver prayers.'0 Also, the
court noted that the speakers would not be given free reign to
address issues, or even a particular issue of political and social
significance.2' Therefore, the court concluded that no one was
granted "indiscriminate use" of SFISD's government-controlled
channel of communication. =2
Because the state cannot discriminate against religious
speech in a limited public forum, the court took great pains to
distinguish limited public forum cases. The court stated that
public forum analysis did not play a role in its Clear Creek
decision and the words public forum were not even mentioned
in the opinion. 3 As a result, the court held that public forum
doctrine could not apply to the July policy and did not
226 See Doe, 168 F.3d at 819-20.
227 See id. at 820.
228 See id
229 See iaL
2'0 See id.
2'1 See Doe, 168 F.3d at 820.
32 Id.
'See id. at 821.
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implicate Free Speech Clause protection as a limited public
forum. 4 Thus, using the Establishment Clause, the court
rejected SFISD's policy because it was missing the
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing restrictions. 2
Lastly, the court addressed whether a prayer policy
including the nonsectarian and nonproselytizing requirements
could be extended to football games. In rejecting the extension
to football games, the court was convinced that the issue was
identical to the Duncanville case discussed earlier." 6 In an
attempt to distinguish the cases, SFISD argued that the
students did not initiate prayers spontaneously.27 Instead, the
students had a voting system. The court quickly rejected this
distinction as unimportant.238 It stated that the controlling and
relevant principle enunciated in Clear Creek was the singular
context and serious nature of a graduation ceremony." Thus,
the court held that SFISD's policy including the nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing restrictions could not be extended to football
games.
240
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
On appeal, the Supreme Court limited its inquiry to the
question of "[w]hether petitioner's policy permitting student-
led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the
Establishment Clause."' l In the first part of its analysis, the
Supreme Court utilized the coercion test in Lee to determine if
the October policy violated the Establishment Clause. Applying
the coercion test, the Court discussed: (1) whether the October
policy messages are private student speech, not public
speech; 2  and (2) whether SFISD's football policy is
distinguishable from the graduation prayer in Lee because it
234 See id.
235 See id.
26 See Doe, 168 F.3d at 822. Duncanville is discussed supra notes 201-204 and
accompanying text.
23 Id.
238 id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301.
242 See id. at 302.
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did not coerce students to participate in religious
observances.4 Lastly, the Supreme Court applied the Lemon
test to decide whether the Does made a premature facial
challenge to the October policy.
2
"
First, the Court announced that Lee's coercion test was
applicable to this case even though Lee involved student prayer
at a different type of school function. " By announcing that
"our analysis is properly guided by the principles that we
endorsed in Lee," " it seemed that Justice Stevens would utilize
the coercion test to judge the constitutionality of the October
policy. However, the opinion is filled with dictum and analysis
from several different Establishment Clause tests.
Before the Court discussed the Establishment Clause, it
addressed the public forum issue and the Free Speech Clause.
The Court recognized that there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion and private speech
endorsing religion. However, the Court rejected SFISD's
argument that the pre-game invocations should be regarded as
private speech because the school officials did not show, either
by policy or by practice, any intent to open the pre-game
ceremony to indiscriminate use by the student body
generally. 7 Instead, the Court opined that the school allowed
only the same student for the entire season to give the
invocation. 8 Therefore, the Court concluded that "selective
access does not transform government property into a public
forum." 9
Second, the Court found that Santa Fe's student
election system ensured that only those messages deemed
"appropriate" under the SFISD's policy would be delivered' °
Here, the Court opined that "the majoritarian process
implemented by SFISD guarantees, by definition, that
minority candidates will never prevail and that their views will
be effectively silenced."2' The Court determined that Santa
2
" See id. at 311.2
"See id. at 314.
See id. at 303.
216 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301.
247 See id.
248 See id.
249 Id. at 303.
26 id.
"'
1 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 303.
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Fe's student election did nothing to protect minority views. 2
The Court found that the SFISD's elections were "insufficient
safeguards of diverse student speech" because fundamental
rights may not be submitted to a vote and do not depend on the
outcome of elections. =3
Third, the Court rejected the argument that the SFISD
adopted a hands-off approach to the pre-game invocation.
Instead, the court found that the realities of the situation
revealed that SFISD's policy involved both perceived and
actual endorsement of religion. The Court found that the
"degree of school involvement" made it clear that the pre-game
prayer bore "the imprint of the State and thus put school-age
children who objected in an untenable position." 4
Fourth, the Court found that the two-step student
election process did not disentangle the district from the
religious messages because the text of the October policy
"exposes the extent of the school's entanglement" and the
policy "by its terms invites and encourages religious
messages." 5 Beyond the text of the policy, the Court noted
that other factors established the endorsement of the religious
message. Some of these factors included: (1) the invocation was
delivered to a large audience assembled as part of a regularly
scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on school
property; and (2) the message was broadcast over the school's
public address system which remains subject to the control of
school officials. 56 The Court also decided that regardless of a
listener's "support for, or objection to, the message, an objective
Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the
pre-game prayer as 'stamped' with her school's seal of
approval." 7
Lastly, the Court rejected SFISD's argument that the
purposes of the policy were secular: to "foster free expression of
private persons as well as to solemnize sporting events,
promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and establish
252 See id.
2
W Id.2  Id.
2545d
Id. at 306.
See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306.257 Id.
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an appropriate environment for competition.""6 The Court
found that SFISD's approval of only one specific kind of
message, an invocation, was not necessary to further any of its
stated purposes? 9 and that permitting only one student to give
a content-limited message suggested that the policy did little to
foster free expression.20 The Court concluded that "regardless
of whether one considers a sporting event an appropriate
occasion for solemnity, the use of an invocation to foster such
solemnity is impermissible when, in actuality, it constitutes
prayer sponsored by the school."26'
In the second part of the analysis, the Court addressed
whether the SFISD's football policy was distinguishable from
the graduation prayer in Lee. Here, the SFISD argued that the
there was no impermissible government coercion because the
pre-game messages are the product of student choicesY.2" The
Court rejected this argument because the issue in the first
election was whether a student would deliver prayer at varsity
football games. Before this election, the students would debate
a religious issue. Furthermore, this case demonstrated that the
"views of the students are not unanimous on [this] issue." 26
This was troubling to the Court. It declared that the
"Establishment Clause purports to remove debate over
[whether to have prayer] from governmental supervision or
control."21 The Court explained that the two student elections
authorized by the policy, coupled with the debates that follow
each, impermissibly invade the private sphere that must be
preserved for religious beliefs and worship. 65 In addition, the
Court clarified that the policy violated the Establishment
Clause because it encouraged "divisiveness along religious
lines in a pubic school setting."
2 6
The SFISD further asserted that there was no coercion
because attendance at an extracurricular event, unlike a
= Id.
9 See id.
260 See id.
211 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306.292See id.
21 Id. at 310.
26 id.
265See id.
' See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310.
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graduation ceremony, is voluntary.267 The Court rejected this
formalistic argument because some students such as
cheerleaders, band members, and team members have seasonal
commitments that mandate their attendance.268 In fact,
Respondent Doe's daughter was a cheerleader at the school.
2 9
Also, the court opined that the choice between whether to
attend the events or to risk facing a "personally offensive
religious ritual is in no practical sense an easy one."2" Finally,
the Court reasoned that the constitutional command "will not
permit the District to exact religious conformity from a student
as the price of joining her classmates at a varsity football
game."27'
In the third part of the analysis, the Court addressed
whether the Does made a premature facial challenge to the
October policy. 2 2  Looking to Lemon to assess the
constitutionality of the policy, the Court examined whether the
policy lacked a "secular legislative purpose." The Court
opined that the October policy had an unconstitutional
purpose. First, the Court noted that the plain language of the
policy demonstrated the school's involvement in the election of
the speaker and the content of the message. 4 Second, the text
of the policy specified a preferred traditional religious
invocation.2 ' Third, the Court stated that the selective access
of the policy and the other content restrictions revealed that it
was not a content-neutral regulation that created a limited
public forum for the expression of student speechY.27 Thus, the
Court concluded that the policy was invalid on its face because
"it establishes an improper majoritarian election on religion,
and unquestionably has the purpose and creates the perception
of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important
school events."277
26 See id.
2
1 Id. at 311.
269 See Respondent's Brief at 46.
211 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.
171 Id. at 313.
27 See id.
27 Id. at 314.
274 See id.
275 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314.
276 See id.
2
"7 Id.
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In a rigorous dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed
out flaws in the majority opinion. He emphasized that this was
a facial challenge to the October policy. Therefore, in facial
challenges in the Establishment Clause context, "[the Court
has] looked to Lemon's three factors to guide the general
nature of our inquiry."278 Yet, Chief Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that the Court is unwilling to be confined to any
single test in this sensitive area. Like the majority opinion, this
assertion allowed the dissent to employ several different tests,
principles, and dictum to achieve its end. Thus, the dissent
suffered from the same vice as the majority opinion.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF SANTA FE
While the Supreme Court properly held that SFISD's
policy was unconstitutional, its decision left unanswered
questions. Unfortunately, the issue in this case was difficult
because it implicated both the public forum doctrine and the
conflict between the religion clauses. As a result, the Court had
to confront the competing principles associated with these
different components of First Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court has found that religious beliefs and expression are forms
of speech and are protected by the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment."9 In addition, some early free speech
decisions involving religious expression relied on the Free
Exercise Clause as well.28° Moreover, statutes and policies that
attempt to accommodate the concerns of adherents of religion
lie at the borderline of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. As a result, the problem of student religious speech
creates intricate problems. In fact, some commentators
question whether the two religion clauses are compatible in a
pluralist nation.28'
Because of the role religion plays in many parts of the
country, it is not unreasonable to assume that other school
781Id. at 315 n.1.
29 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 573 (1999).
"
7 See it at 573.
281 See id. at 611. The authors note that the Establishment Clause requires
(some sort of) neutrality, while the Free Exercise Clause requires (some sort of)
preference to religion and may permit other preferences. See id.
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districts will attempt to create policies similar to SFISD.
Furthermore, it is foreseeable that school districts will attempt
to seek refuge in the public forum doctrine and claim viewpoint
discrimination against religion. As a result, the Court needs to
draw a brighter line in these cases between government speech
and private speech. More importantly, the Court needs to use
only one test to govern the issues in this area of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. The Court can no longer use malleable
doctrines and dictum from different Establishment Clause
cases and tests to justify its findings. Instead, the Court needs
to provide a uniform Establishment Clause test that gives
lower courts and school districts guidance in this troublesome
area.
This final section of the Note will first examine the
Santa Fe Court's private speech analysis. Then, it will explore
the Court's utilization of different Establishment Clause tests
throughout the opinion. Next, this Note will briefly examine
the Chandler and Adler decisions. Lastly, this Note will posit
that one solution is to: (1) apply forum analysis and its
categorical approach; and (2) conduct an Establishment Clause
inquiry using an "any reasonable observer endorsement test"
version of the endorsement test instead of Lee's coercion test.
A. The Private Speech Analysis in Santa Fe
When confronted with SFISD's argument that the
messages are private student speech, the Court immediately
cited dictum from Board of Education of Westside Community
v. Mergens82 that "there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect."" Although the Court agreed with the distinction, it
was not persuaded that the pre-game invocations should be
regarded as private speech. Yet, the Court did not adequately
explain the reasons why these invocations are not private
speech. Because this dictum from Mergens has been cited in
many cases, it is useful to examine the original context. After
282 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
2 Id. at 250.
1330 [Vol. 67: 4
THE FALLEN BRICKS OF THE WALL
stating this proposition, the Mergens Court stated, "we think
that secondary school students are mature enough and are
likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support
student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory
basis."' The Court further stated that the proposition that
schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not
complicated.285 Lastly, the Court supported the proposition that
"students below the college level are capable of distinguishing
between State-initiated, school-sponsored, or teacher-led
religious speech on the one hand and student-initiated,
student-led religious speech on the other."286
It is questionable whether the Court should be relying
on this case at all. First, the Mergens Court was interpreting a
federal statute that allowed religious speech in a situation
entirely different from pre-football game ceremonies. Second, it
is clear by its language that the Mergens Court was applying
the endorsement test, not the coercion test. In fact, the coercion
test was formulated after the Mergens case. Therefore, the
Mergens Court was not using the principles established in Lee
to guide its analysis as the Santa Fe Court claimed.
The Santa Fe Court also stated that although the
SFISD relied on cases involving public forum analysis, it is
"clear" that the pre-game ceremony is not the type of forum
discussed in those cases. Subsequently, the Court importantly
stated that "a conclusion that the District had created a public
forum would help shed light on whether the resulting speech is
public or private." 7 Here, the Court cited to Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.
Pinnette. In that case, the plurality opinion formulated a per se
approach holding that religious expression does not violate the
Establishment Clause where it is purely private and occurs in
a traditional or designated public forum. Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the plurality's per se approach to speech in
public forums and would not "carve out an exception to the
endorsement test for the public forum context."288 Although this
Note posits that Justice O'Connor's approach was the better
28 Id.
285 See id.
286 Id.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 303 n.13.
W3 id.
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approach, citing this statement was troubling for several
reasons. First, the Court used the ambiguous term "public
forum." However, as Perry and its progeny explained, there is a
separate analysis regarding each distinct forum. The Court
failed to establish whether it would rule one way or another
due to the creation of a traditional public forum, a limited
public forum, or a nonpublic forum. Second, the concurrence in
Pinette is clearly using the endorsement test. Citing Allegheny,
Justice O'Connor stated that "in my view, the endorsement test
asks the right question about governmental practice
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds." 9 By invoking
Allegheny's endorsement test, the Court mixed a different
Establishment Clause test with the principles announced in
Lee. Thus, the Court left courts and school districts guessing
which test or which principles properly guide the analysis in
this sensitive area of law.
B. The Mixing and Matching of Different Establishment
Clause Tests
Throughout the Santa Fe opinion, the Court utilized
dictum and principles from different Establishment Clause
tests and cases. As a result, the Court has given lower courts
an opportunity to justify its decision using principles and tests
created by different Supreme Court justices. Because of the
change in the make-up of the Supreme Court, it is foreseeable
that decisions will be based on principles espoused by justices
no longer on the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Supreme Court
should clarify the law in this particular context by using one
Establishment Clause test.
In Santa Fe, the majority opinion is filled with
principles and dictum from all of the Establishment Clause
tests. First, the Court began the opinion by stating that "our
analysis is properly guided by the principles that we endorsed
in Lee."29° Then, the Court opined that "the realities of the
situation plainly reveal that its policy involves both perceived
and actual endorsement of religion."29' In the following
2 See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette 515 U.S. 753, 772 (1995).
m See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301.
2" See id. at 305.
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paragraph, the Court stated "the District has attempted to
disentangle itself from the religious messages by developing
the two-step student election process."2 9  Then, the Court
claimed that the "actual or perceived endorsement of the
message, moreover, is established by factors beyond just the
text of the policy." 23 Later in the opinion, the Court returned to
discussing the "coercive element of the... message." However,
as the dissent points out, the Court acknowledged that this
case is a facial challenge to the policy late in the opinion. More
importantly, the Court stated that "as in previous cases
involving facial challenges on Establishment Clause
grounds... we assess the constitutionality of an enactment by
reference to the three factors first articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman." One wonders whether the other two-thirds of the
opinion were necessary. Then, after announcing the Lemon
test, the Court strays from its test. The Court discusses
"endorsement" as well as coercion throughout the rest of the
opinion.
Mixing and matching principles from different
Establishment Clause tests is troubling and irresponsible in
this particularized context. The Court needs to set a single
standard and test to provide uniformity for school districts and
lower courts throughout the country.
C. Chandler v. Siegelman
The concerns expressed above occurred in a recent
Eleventh Circuit decision. In Chandler, the Eleventh Circuit
addressed an action challenging the facial constitutionality of
Alabama's statute permitting non-sectarian, non-proselytizing
student-initiated prayer, invocations, and benedictions during
compulsory or non-compulsory school-related assemblies,
sporting events, graduation ceremonies, and other school-
related events.294 After the lower court instituted a permanent
injunction, the school district appealedY.
292 See id. at 305-06.
"s See id. at 307.
See Chandler, 230 F.3d at 1314.
25 See id. The court of appeals vacated the permanent injunction holding that
the injunction may neither prohibit genuinely student-initiated religious speech, nor
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In its opinion,2" the Eleventh Circuit, on remand from
the Supreme Court, held that the "the prayer condemned there
(in Santa Fe) was coercive precisely because it was not
private."297 Then, the Eleventh Circuit summarily asserted:
"the Court's holding in Santa Fe is only that State-sponsored,
coercive prayer is forbidden by the Constitution."29M As a result,
many concerns are raised by Chandler such as whether: (1)
this was the only holding of Santa Fe, (2) it necessarily follows
that the Santa Fe Court was only concerned with coercion and
not endorsement, and (3) whether lower courts should ignore
forum analysis. Moreover, the next paragraph of the Eleventh
Circuit opinion called the soundness of Santa Fe into question.
The Eleventh Circuit stated that Santa Fe explicitly reaffirms
the basic principle espoused in Mergens, that "there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion,
which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect."299 Then, the Eleventh Circuit significantly
asserted that "Santa Fe leaves unanswered, however, under
what circumstances religious speech in schools can be
considered private and, therefore, protected." ° Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit in Chandler highlighted the fact that Santa
Fe's incomplete analysis has created uncertainty in this area.
As a result, lower courts were left to decide which
Establishment Clause test to follow and apply when confronted
with similar issues.
D. Adler v. Duval County School Board
In addition to the mixed signals sent by the Chandler
decision, the Supreme Court this term has added even more
apply restrictions on the time, place, and manner of that speech which exceed those
placed on student's secular speech.
296 On June 26, 2000 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Chandler,
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Santa Fe. On remand the Eleventh Circuit reinstated its opinion and judgment.
Chandler v. Siegelman, 530 U.S. 1256 (2000).297 Chandler, 230 F.3d at 1315.
29 Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 1317.
300 Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
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uncertainty to the law governing student-led prayer in public
schools. On December 10, 2001, the Supreme Court refused to
review the Eleventh Circuit decision upholding a Florida school
district's policy permitted graduating students to vote on
whether to have unrestricted student-led messages at the
beginning and closing of graduation ceremonies.30'
Unfortunately, the Duval policy represents the same
Establishment Clause dangers found in the unconstitutional
Santa Fe policy.
In Adler, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Duval
policy was distinguishable from Santa Fe because it did not
allow school officials to review the content of the student
message."2  Because the Duval students chose their own
message for the ceremony, the Eleventh Circuit found the
student speech not state-sponsored.33 However, the Santa Fe
Court rejected the same "circuit-breaker" argument. Jay
Sekulow, arguing on behalf of the Santa Fe petitioners, urged
that the policy created the ultimate circuit-breaker because the
independent, individual student determined the content of the
message.3 In rejecting this argument, the Court found that
"contrary to the District's repeated assertions that it has
adopted a 'hands-off approach.., the realities of the situation
plainly reveal that its policy involves both perceived and actual
endorsement of religion." 5 Thus, this same hands-off approach
cannot render the Duval policy constitutional.
Moreover, Justice Souter's question during the Santa Fe
oral argument demonstrates the Establishment Clause
dangers clearly present in the Duval policy. He asked
if the student who is chosen exercises that student's choice to pray,
we are still faced with a system in which it is the school or the school
district that provides the forum in which this is going to appear,
so See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 122 S. Ct. 664 (2001). Two years ago,
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the initial Eleventh Circuit decision to be
considered in light of Santa Fe. See Adler, 531 U.S. 801 (2000). After reviewing Santa
Fe, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated its en banc decision in favor of the school district.
See Adler 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001).
30 See Adler, 250 F. 3d. at 1336.
"See Adler, 250 F. 3d at 1337-38.
3 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Santa Fe v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000),
available at 2000 WL 374300 at *17.
"
35 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305.
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requires the attendance of a certain number of students to be there
and, therefore, requires those students to sit there while a prayer is
going on. What more do we need to decide the Establishment Clause
case?"'
Clearly, Justice Souter succinctly illuminates Establishment
Clause concerns that the Eleventh Circuit disregarded in
Adler. Undoubtedly, this exact question could be posed to the
Duval school district lawyer. Therefore, despite its minor
variations, the Duval policy still offends the Establishment
Clause."7 Although the Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari in this case, it will certainly face future challenges to
similar policies. Thus, the Court must give clearer guidance to
lower courts, clarify its approach to this issue, and pay proper
respect to the Establishment Clause.
E. One Possible Remedy
As noted above, the Court over time has applied several
different tests and principles to the issue of school prayer. 8
However, the Court has been unwilling to confine itself to a
single test in the entire area of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Still, lower courts need clearer guidance to
determine the constitutionality of school policies allowing
student-led, student initiated prayers at extra-curricular
events and pre-game ceremonies. As the Eleventh Circuit
decisions highlight, the Court should no longer announce that
it is guided in a certain area by the principles of one test and
rest its decision on principles and language from other tests.
One possible remedy is to pursue a two-step analysis in this
context. First, courts should apply forum analysis with its
categorical approach. Second, the courts should use a
particularized form of the endorsement test that asks whether
the challenged policy has the purpose or effect of endorsing
religion by focusing on the perception of any reasonable
observer. This Note will elaborate on the two steps of the
30 See Tr. of Oral Argument at *17.
307 One difference was that the Duval policy did not contain the word
"invocation."
'08 For an overview of developments, see Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of
Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994).
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analysis, address some counterarguments, and apply the
analysis to a hypothetical situation.
1. Step One: Conducting a Public Forum Analysis
In Santa Fe, the Court held that the SFISD policy did
not create a public forum. However, the Court did state that "a
conclusion that the District had created a public forum would
shed light on whether the resulting speech is public or
private." As a result, school districts may seek refuge in the
public forum doctrine and argue that the messages given under
their policy are protected private speech. Thus, lower courts
must still engage in public forum analysis to address this
argument. As a result, the first prong of the proposed analysis
is to determine in which category the forum belongs and
engage in the analysis enunciated in Perry.
Under this analysis, the pre-game ceremony context
clearly does not lend itself to the classic, or quintessential,
traditional public forum, such as a park or a sidewalk.
However, when the forum is not a historic type of public forum,
but has nonetheless been opened to the public's first
amendment activities, a designated public forum may have
been created. In this forum, following Widmar, Mergens, and
Lamb's Chapel, lower courts will apply strict scrutiny when
schools exclude speakers based on their religious speech.
Finally, if lower courts determine that the school district
created a nonpublic forum, the government will be free to
exclude speech or speakers based upon the subject of the
message, except in cases of viewpoint discrimination. For
example, the lower court could allow a regulation such as "no
religious speech in this forum." However, it could not allow
viewpoint discrimination in a regulation such as "no Buddhist
speech in this forum."
When analyzing religious speech in traditional or
designated public forums, some commentators argue that the
Court should apply the per se rule from Pinette.31° In that case,
the plurality held that "religious expression cannot violate the
39 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305.
310 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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Establishment Clause where it is (1) purely private and (2)
occurs in a traditional or designated public forum." 1 The court
found that an expression is private simply when someone other
than a state actor engages in the speech. However, I agree with
Justice O'Connor's concurrence and Stevens dissent in Pinette
that this approach is flawed and pays little respect to the
Establishment Clause. It is unwise to allow the public forum
doctrine to convey an absolute constitutional right to engage in
religious speech. Despite the forum, students may still be
unwillingly exposed to others' religious views. Worse, the views
may be espoused in a setting surrounded by indicia of the
school. As a result, the students may be subjected to evils the
Establishment Clause forbids. Therefore, lower courts should
not find the type of forum dispositive and should conduct an
Establishment Clause inquiry.
2. Step Two: Applying the Modified Endorsement Test
After the forum has been established, courts should
employ an Establishment Clause inquiry using the "any
reasonable observer endorsement" version of the endorsement
test. This step is derived from Justice Stevens' Pinette dissent
in which he advocated that a religious display would violate
the Establishment Clause when some reasonable observer
would attribute a religious message to the State.12
In order to correctly apply this standard, lower courts
need to focus on an objectively reasonable person. In Pinette,
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence and Justice Stevens in his
dissent disagreed about the reasonable observer's state of mind
when observing a religious display in a limited public forum.
Justice O'Connor gave the reasonable person knowledge of the
forum's history and past uses.3 3 In contrast, Stevens argued
against assuming the observer knew the existence of a public
forum. 14 Justice Stevens pointed out that "Justice O'Connor
apparently would not extend Establishment Clause protection
"' Id. at 770.
312 Id. at 800 n.5.
... Id. at 808 n.14.
314 Id. at 807.
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to passers-by who are unaware of Capitol Square's history."'5
Extending this logic to the Santa Fe context, some students
will be unaware of the school property's history and uses.
Therefore, the same objectively reasonable standard should be
utilized in this particular school speech context."' This focus
will better prevent students from feeling like outsiders in
matters of religion and believing that their sovereign supports
a faith to which they do not subscribe.
In employing this second prong, lower courts should not
utilize language or dictum from other Establishment Clause
inquiries. Therefore, in the Santa Fe context, the Court should
abandon the Lee test because it is a malleable doctrine and too
subjective in nature. While courts may look at a situation and
attempt to figure out if a state is endorsing or favoring religion,
a judgment that a "nonadherent" feels coercion is too personal
in nature. In addition, the coercion test gives courts an
opportunity to use formalistic arguments to reach their
intended result. Moreover, because different towns have
different cultural makeups, a student in Maine may feel
coerced whereas a student in Alabama in a similar situation
may not. In sum, this prong is a more workable analytical tool
and better protects Establishment Clause values.
3. Step 3. Applying the Two-Part Test -
By applying the above analysis to a hypothetical case, I
hope to clarify the analysis and show the intricacies involved in
this problem. Suppose a school in town X conducts a "pep-rally"
assembly every afternoon before its football games. The high
school students would sit in the bleachers and the football
coach would announce the players. Next, assume that the
school has a policy allowing a student to approach the podium
and give a two-minute "message" to the student body.
Traditionally, the team captain, the head cheerleader, and the
student council president address the student body using the
microphone on the podium. Here, the school did not evince any
5 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 808 n.15.
316 In Pinette, Justice Stevens argued that "a person who views an exotic cow
at the zoo as a symbol of the government's approval of the Hindu religion" would be not
be objectively reasonable. Id.
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intent to open this forum to the public. Additionally,
historically and traditionally the school property is not open for
free speech debate and activity. Under Perry, it seems the
school is not allowing "indiscriminate use" by the general
public and the property would be a nonpublic forum. However,
arguably the school's policy opens the school property to a
certain class of speakers. Also, this practice may be a tradition
practiced every year. Therefore, it is foreseeable that the school
district X would argue that the three students would be
engaging in private speech that the Free Speech Clause
protects. As a result, the school will claim that it does not want
to engage in viewpoint discrimination against religious speech.
Furthermore, assume that two students are in the
audience who recently moved to town X. These students are
devout followers of religion Y. At the conclusion of the football
captain's speech, he recites a Christian prayer to the entire
school. After the football captain, the other students recite the
same prayer. Is it possible that the two religion Y students in
the audience will attribute the football captain's comments to
the school? What if these students completely disagree with
Christianity and are utterly offended? Many issues need to be
considered. First, the school district could argue that the
football captain's expression would be his own private student
speech because the school did not direct the captain or control
his choice of message in any way. Second, the pep-rally has
many of the earmarks of the school. The pep-rally was a
regularly-scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on
school property. Third, the school had a policy that allowed
these messages to be given to the rest of the student body.
Lastly, the three students used a microphone and stood on a
school podium covered with the indicia of the school. As a
result, the public forum analysis cannot end the inquiry.
Under the coercion test, it is possible that the religion Y
students may feel that the school is "coercing" them to support
or participate in the Christian religion. On the other hand,
these students may not feel any coercion and believe the
prayers are innocuous. A court may rule either way in this
case. This type of guessing and probing into the subjective
mind is one of the vices of Lee's coercion test.
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Under the second prong of the proposed analysis, the
courts should utilize the "any reasonable observer
endorsement" test. In this example, the court would then look
to whether the school was endorsing, favoring, promoting or
preferring the religious belief espoused by the students
focusing on any reasonable observer. Furthermore, the courts
should look to whether reasonable observers would attribute a
religious message to the state. When applying the reasonable
observer standard, courts should not look to an ideal observer
with knowledge of the history and values of the community.
The religion Y students may not know the history or the policy
surrounding this activity. Also, the students do not understand
the intricacies of the First Amendment and do not know the
difference between a public forum, a limited public forum, and
a nonpublic forum. It is problematic to attribute to some
observers knowledge that would save the policy from an
Establishment Clause violation. Instead, the, courts should
determine whether an objectively reasonable student listener
of the religious speech would be likely to perceive government
endorsement.
Applying this standard to the students of religion Y, the
court must remember that they are students in the school who
are equally entitled to be free from government endorsement of
the Christian religion. Under this version of the endorsement
test, the courts should test the situation using objective
criteria. Here, the school had a policy of allowing these
messages to be given to the entire student body. Many of the
indicia of the school are present. Also, the students are
assembled as part of a regularly-scheduled, school-sponsored
function on the school's athletic field and stadium. Regardless
of whether the students of religion Y feel coerced by the school
to participate or approve of the Christian prayer, it seems
objectively reasonable that the school is endorsing the
Christian prayer. Although the other students may wish to
pray privately, they should not be able to utilize the school's
microphone and podium to espouse their religious views.
In conclusion, Lee's coercion test gives lower courts and
school districts more room to defy Supreme Court principles.
Instead of concentrating on objective determinations, the
coercion test focuses on the subjective views of the students. It
is evident that these views may differ dramatically with each
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student and that some students may be more sensitive than
others. Therefore, the "any reasonable observer" version of the
endorsement test is a better analytical tool. Instead of mixing
and matching old principles of Supreme Court jurisprudence,
the Court should employ a single straightforward test for this
troublesome area of the Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court exacerbated the
controversial area of school prayer. The Court utilized several
different tests and rationales to find the policy
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the Court carelessly used
dictum that left many questions and concerns unresolved. The
decision leaves lower courts without clear guidance on which
test to employ and results in inconsistent decisions. As the
Chandler decision highlights, lower courts may deviate from
the central holding of Santa Fe by citing to unanswered
questions concerning private speech. One possible solution is
for courts to utilize the single test proposed above in this
particularized context: First conduct a public forum analysis,
and second, apply the "any reasonable observer" version of the
endorsement test. Until the Supreme Court employs a
straightforward, clear analysis, lower courts will wander and
fend for themselves in the depths of this confusing and
intricate area of jurisprudence.
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